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An Instrument for Carbon Bears 





Temporary crediting of carbon storage is a proposed instrument that allows 
entities with emissions reductions obligations to defer some obligations for a fixed 
period of time. This instrument provides a means of guaranteeing the 
environmental integrity of a carbon sequestration project.  But because the user 
of the temporary credit takes on the liability of renewing it, or replacing it with a 
permanent credit, the temporary credit must sell at a discount compared to a 
permanent credit.  We show that this discount depends on the expected change in 
price of a permanent credit.  Temporary credits have value only if restrictions on 
carbon emissions are not expected to tighten substantially. The intuition is 
illustrated by assessing the value of a hypothetical temporary sulfur dioxide 
sequestration credit, using historical data on actual SO2 allowance prices. 
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Carbon sequestration projects—such as plantations, agroforestry, 
improved agricultural techniques, or geological sequestration—offer 
potentially cost-effective ways of removing CO2 from the atmosphere, 
or of keeping it out of the atmosphere in the first place.  
But unlike abatement in the energy sector, each such project faces 
some risk of reversal. Forests and fruit trees can burn. Geological 
formations can leak. Soil carbon can be released if exposed. The risk of 
non-permanence has inspired a search for means of insuring the 
integrity of carbon credits based on sequestration projects (Watson et 
al., 2000). One frequently discussed option is to provide for temporary 
crediting of carbon storage (UNFCCC, 2000, Sedjo and Marland, 2003, 
Locatelli and Pedroni, 2003). A project proponent would guarantee 
carbon sequestration for, say, five years, or from one Kyoto 
commitment period to the next. At the end of that period, the 
temporary credit expires. The holder suffers a debit on his carbon 
account, which he can make up for securing a reduction based on an 
energy project, by retiring an emissions allowance from the second 
commitment period, or by renewing the temporary credit if the 
sequestration project is still ongoing.  
This approach has two strong advantages. Environmental integrity 
is guaranteed  without requiring perpetual maintenance and 
monitoring of a sink. And options are preserved for host countries, 
who need not commit to maintaining a forest in perpetuity.   
But do temporary credits make economic sense? The purchaser of a 
temporary credit takes on a liability: the necessity to find a follow-on 
credit. Under what conditions would anyone want to assume such a 
liability? Because temporary credits carry this liability, they are bound 
to sell at a discount compared to “permanent” emissions reductions 
from energy projects. Who will want to sell them? 
The plan of the paper is as follows. First we discuss the equilibrium 
price of temporary credits, in the absence and presence of futures   3
markets. These analyses provide a rough picture of the potential price 
differential between a permanent and temporary credit—a differential 
we argue might be substantial. We then assess the implications of this 
differential for the supply of temporary credits. Finally we discuss 
alternative mechanisms to assure permanence of sequestration.  
2.  Price of Temporary Credits 
We assume an active market for 2008-2012 period carbon credits. That 
market can stem from entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, or from 
other similar regulations such as trading within the E.U.  
2.1.  With Futures Markets and Advanced Purchase Requirement 
We start by assuming that there is also a market for credits to be 
delivered in the second commitment period (2013-2017). ( “Distant” 
futures markets such as this occur in the SO2 allowance market.) We 
assume also that national authorities or international agreements 
allow the use of a temporary credit for the first commitment period 
only in conjunction with current purchase of a permanent second 
period credit. This assures the integrity of the emission reduction that 
is initiated with the temporary credit2.  
Let Ps,t be the price for delivery in commitment period s of a 
permanent credit that can be used in commitment period t. Let Ptemp 
be the current (commitment period 1) price of a temporary carbon 
credit. Then a buyer with carbon obligations for the first commitment 
period could either buy a current permanent credit, or combine a 
temporary credit with the forward purchase of a second period 
permanent credit. At market equilibrium, ignoring transaction costs, 
the prices of these alternatives should be equal. Hence: 
Ptemp + P1,2 = P1,1  (1) 
                                                 
2 This provision – not a feature of current proposals -- is suggested as a means of insuring 
the global community against the bankruptcy of the temporary credit holder. An unexpected 
rise in the price of renewing or redeeming at temporary credit could in fact provoke 
bankruptcy and failure to honor the obligations to redeem the temporary credit.  Renewability 
could however be accommodated by selling the second period credit and buying a third period 
credit at the time of renewal.     4
Thus: 
Ptemp = P1,1 – P1,2   (2) 
The magnitude of the right hand side of (2) depends on 
intertemporal shifts in supply and demand, and on whether or not 
borrowing is permitted. First, suppose that the allowance market is 
expected to tighten significantly between the current and future 
periods. This would be the case, for instance, if the total number of 
future allowances was expected to decrease, while business-as-usual 
emissions were expected to increase. Then the price of allowances 
would tend to rise more rapidly than the rate of interest.  However, 
banking would allow arbitragers to buy and bank period 1 allowances 
and simultaneously sell futures contracts, thus driving P1,1 up and P2,2 
down. Absent transactions costs, the price rise would be limited to the 
rate of interest at equilibrium, so that P1,1 ≈ P 1,2, and thus Ptemp ≈ 0.  
Bailley (1998) notes that a small convenience yield might attach to 
holding an earlier permit, so that P1,1 might be slightly greater than 
P1,2. She notes that in pre 1998 SO2 allowance markets, this differential 
was only about 3%. 
Suppose, instead, that prices were expected to stay relatively 
constant across periods. This might be true, for instance, if the total 
number of allowances remained constant, while technological change 
shifted downwards the marginal abatement cost curve. If it were 
possible to borrow allowances from the future, then P2,2 would be bid 
up, and the differential between P1,1  and P1,2  would again tend to 
vanish, so that again Ptemp ≈ 0. 
However, in both the SO2 and currently-structured carbon markets, 
borrowing is not allowed.  Schennach (2000) shows that this can drive 
a significant wedge ￿ between P1,1 and  P1,2, so that  P1,1 = P1,2 +￿. This 
wedge can be interpreted as the shadow cost associated with the 
inability to borrow allowances from the future.  Since the temporary 
credit provides, in effect, a license to borrow from the future, Ptemp= ￿.  
Consider a rough numerical example. Suppose that negotiations 
around second period emissions allocations result in an expected 
maintenance of the same real price of carbon, i.e. P1,1 = E(P2,2). Then we   5
expect, roughly, P1,2 = ￿ E(P2,2), where ￿ is a discount factor that may 
include risk. If the discount rate is 6% and the time between 
c o m m i t m e n t  p e r i o d s  i s  f i v e  y e a r s ,  t h e n  a  t e m p o r a r y  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  
credit is worth about 25% of a permanent one.  
This calculation, however, applies only to the first temporary credit 
placed on the market.  As the supply of temporary credits increases, 
more borrowing takes place, the price differential P1,1 – P1,2 decreases, 
and the market value of the temporary credits declines. 
2.2.  A Thought Experiment: What if There Were Temporary SO2 
Credits? 
To gain further insights into the potential price of temporary CO2 
credits, let us use as a model the existing market for SO2 allowances in 
the U.S. U.S. utilities are allocated an annual quota of allowances.  The 
U.S. EPA also auctions allowances both for the current vintage (year t) 
and for the future vintage (year t+7). The allowances are tradable and 
bankable, and futures markets exist. Utilities typically manage their 
allowances with a horizon of many years, and can utilize a 
sophisticated derivative market to manage risk. Available instruments 
include futures, swaps, and options.  
In this context, let us suppose that there were a technology for 
temporary sulfur sequestration, and that utilities were allowed to use 
a temporary credit in the manner described in the previous section. 
That is, the utility could emit a ton of SO2 today (year t) by holding a 
seven-year temporary sequestration credit together with an allowance 
for year t+7. What is the most that utilities would be willing to pay for 
temporary sequestration services? 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of Pt,t and Pt,t+7 over the period t=1995-
2002, as recorded in the annual EPA auctions of spot and 7-year 
forward allowances. Until 1998, the gap between the current price of a 
current allowance and the current price of a future allowance was less 
than 6%. Hence there would have been essentially no demand for 
temporary sulfur sequestration, even if the supply cost was negligible. 
Starting in 1999, however, the gap begins to widen, and by 2002 it is a   6
substantial (58%).  Thus a hypothetical temporary sulfur sequestration 
allowance would have been virtually worthless before 1999, but 
valuable thereafter. 
What caused this divergence? It appears to be associated with the 
advent of Phase II of the allowance program in 2000.  That Phase 
reduced the total annual issuance of allowances, and increased the 
number of plants required to participate, compared to the earlier 
Phase.  Hence before t=2000, spot prices valued allowances in the 
loose Phase I market, and future t+7 prices referred to a much tighter 
Phase II market.  As in the first scenario above, Pt,t ≈ Pt,t+7, a finding 
reported by Bailey (1998).  However, by 2000, both spot and futures 
prices referred to a market with approximately constant supply and 
demand characteristics. This introduced the wedge foreseen by 
Schennach. 
2.3.  Without Futures Market or Advanced Purchase Requirement 
Robust futures markets may not arise for a while, given uncertainties 
about second commitment period allowances (including which 
countries participate in the Kyoto framework and accept emissions 
limitations), and about the global economy. So let us now suppose that 
futures markets are absent. We suppose that private parties are 
permitted to use temporary sequestration credits towards their first 
period compliance requirements, and must post some kind of 
collateral to ensure that they will replace the temporary credit with a 
permanent one (Again this is necessary to ensure integrity of the 
reduction; else a bankrupt holder of a temporary credit might fail to 
make it whole.) Hence the holder of a temporary credit is taking on a 
risky liability: the price of a permanent credit may go up.  
In the absence of price guidance from futures markets—and because 
banking volumes are not revealed till the end of the first commitment 
period, the amount of banking may be insufficient to moderate price 
rise. 
Suppose, for instance, that the U.S. ratifies Kyoto late in the first 
commitment period, and that banking is indeed inadequate to reduce   7
permit prices between the first and second period. It is conceivable 
that prices could increase tenfold between periods. This would lead to 
remorse among buyers who had declined to purchase a first-period 
permanent credit, opting instead for a temporary credit and a second-
period permanent credit. On the other hand, if Kyoto collapsed 
entirely, then the purchaser of a temporary credit would probably end 
up benefiting. In short, the buyer will purchase a temporary credit 
only when:3 
Ptemp+ ￿ ⌡ ⌠ P2,2 f(P2,2) dP2,2 < P1,1 (3) 
In this equation, f(.) is the (subjective) probability distribution of 
price P2,2, and ￿ is now the buyer’s personal discount factor. Some 
rough guesses at the probability of alternative outcomes suggests that, 
under these circumstances buyers would find temporary credits 
unattractive if they perceived even a small chance of a near-term price 
spike (scenarios f to i in Table 1). For buyers with high discount rates 
and a bearish view of future prices, temporary credits are somewhat 
more attractive (scenarios a, b or e in Table 1). 
2.4.  A Hedging Strategy in the Absence of Futures Markets 
The last section tells us that the most likely ultimate buyer of a 
temporary sequestration credit is an entity, faced with current carbon 
liabilities, with a high discount rate and bearish views on the 
evolution of carbon prices. Complementing this buyer, and in the 
absence of a liquid futures market, there may exist sellers of future 
permanent reductions, who share the bearish view and the high 
discount rates. For instance, current installation of an energy-efficient 
building or of a low-emissions power plant may result in a stream of 
emissions reductions for decades to come. It may be possible to 
package these future reductions with current temporary credits in a 
way that provides a secure and price-competitive alternative to a 
current permanent reduction. 
                                                 
3 This equation is valid only when the cost of allowances at both periods are small 
compared to the revenue level of the buyer at first and second period (C1 and C2).   8
For instance, suppose that the current (2003) price of carbon is 
$3/tonne. A real-estate developer seeks carbon revenue by 
redesigning a proposed office building for increased energy efficiency. 
The office building has a minimum expected life of 20 years and 
produces new permanent reductions each year relative to the baseline. 
To finance the building, the developer contracts to sell each year’s 
reductions at $3, through 2012, with payment on delivery. The 
developer may be happy to sell, in addition, post-2012 reductions for a 
current payment of $0.75/tonne, reflecting pessimism on carbon 
prices and current investment opportunities offering high rates of 
return (say, 15%). After allowing another $0.75/tonne for insurance 
and transactions costs, this might allow payment of up to $1.50/tonne 
for a temporary credit. Of course, in the presence of thin markets, the 
division of gains between the seller of temporary credit and the real-
estate developer would be subject to negotiation. 
A further refinement might be to bundle temporary credits with call 
options to buy permanent emission reductions. This way, the buyer is 
insured both against the risk that the price of carbon at second period 
goes too high, in which case she can exercise the option and pay a pre-
agreed strike price, and against the risk that the price of carbon 
becomes too low, in which case he or she can buy directly on the 
market without exercising the option. 
These numbers are sheer guesswork, but are not entirely 
implausible. They suggest that a ‘bundling’ strategy may be a way to 
muster a non-negligible price for temporary credits while also 
financing carbon projects involving long-lived infrastructure. 
3.  Supply of Temporary Credits 
Even under the “bundling” strategy described below, temporary 
sequestration credits may have to sell at a substantial discount 
compared to current permanent credits. On the supply side, this 
would mean low near-term revenue. 
There is however the possibility that suppliers will be able to ‘re-
rent’ the same sink in the future, providing a continuing (though   9
uncertain) stream of income. Whether the project sponsor can sell 
upfront a stream of two or three temporary credits instead of one 
depends on the credibility of his claim that the project will remain 
permanent over that period of time. Assuming carbon prices remain 
flat during the first three commitment periods, and using again the 6% 
risk-free discount rate, we have seen that one temporary credit might 
be worth 25% of a permanent one. But two sequential temporary 
credits (10 year conservation) are worth 44% of a permanent one, and 
three (15 years conservation) are worth 58% of a permanent one. That 
duration remains in the range of what a typical forestry projects need 
to provide anyway. 
Lower prices for temporary credits are discouraging for many kinds 
of forestation projects. These typically require large up-front 
investments in planting, and slow carbon accumulation during the 
first years of growth. Low carbon payments further decrease the 
financial attractiveness of these projects. In fact, estimates of the 
marginal sequestration cost curves for the U.S. (Lubowski et al., 2002) 
suggest that—at low carbon prices—the elasticity of volume 
sequestered to carbon prices is very high. 
Less affected are some types of biosequestration not currently 
creditable under Kyoto. Deforestation prevention, for instance, may in 
some cases not require large up-front investments and can 
immediately prevent significant emissions. Abandonment to regrowth 
of pasture or of secondary vegetation may have similar characteristics.  
Geological carbon sequestration may be an intermediate case, with 
high upfront costs but immediate results in emission reductions. 
4.  An Alternative to Temporary Credits 
Our analysis suggests that temporary credits could sell at a steep 
discount relative to permanent credits. Moreover, the better the 
perceived prospects for increasingly tight limits on carbon emissions, 
the lower the value attached to temporary credits. 
This is a somewhat perverse result, because some ‘temporary’ 
sequestration projects are likely, in fact, to be quasi-permanent. For   10
instance, some natural forests may be under only temporary pressure 
for conversion to agriculture—pressure that will ease in the course of 
economic development as urbanization increases and pulls farmers 
away from marginal lands. Some planted forests may generate self-
reinforcing financial and social incentives for their indefinite 
maintenance. For instance, a community-run forest in the Val di 
Fiemme, Italy, has been sustainably managed since 1111 (Jeanrenaud, 
2001). Some wood products may enjoy long useful lives of decades or 
centuries. And some geological formations may sequester injected CO2 
for centuries without physical leakage.  
While none of these sequestration projects are perfectly secure, 
arguably each of them has a good chance of enduring for fifty or a 
hundred years—long enough to bridge the gap to an era when 
abatement of permanent emissions is relatively inexpensive. Thus a 
portfolio of such projects, carefully screened and engineered, may 
arguably retain 80% or 90% of the carbon it contains. This suggests an 
ex-ante risk discounting approach for assuring claims for permanent 
credits based on sequestration projects. 
The approach would be to pre-certify sequestration projects based 
on their expected half-life, or the proportion of the sink expected to be 
in place after 60 or 80 years. The project’s carbon sequestration 
‘output’ would be reduced by the proportion expected to be lost. That 
is, the project would be awarded partial credits based on ex ante risk 
assessment. This entails lower overhead costs than an approach based 
on perpetual monitoring of the status of portfolios of temporary 
credits.   
How difficult would it be to make the ex ante assessment? For many 
project types, there may be ample historical experience with 
analogous projects or processes. For instance, there may be historical 
data on the longevity and integrity of forest plantations, wood 
products, and parks. 
Can certifiers be trusted to be honest? In this respect, the task is no 
different than baseline certification under the CDM. The certifier’s 
baseline decision has direct financial bearing on the project’s   11
profitability, and the integrity of the system requires institutions to 
maintain the integrity of the certification process. 
What if the certifiers turn out to be wrong? Again there is an 
analogy with baseline-setting. It is possible that baselines are 
systematically set wrong. But except in the very special case where 
there happens to be good “control group” for the project, we will 
simply never know if the baselines were wrong. For ex ante risk 
discounting we will know, eventually. If risks are estimated 
conservatively—as seems prudent—then the climatic benefit will be 
greater than expected. The global, long-term risk of being 
systematically wrong needs to be balanced against the global long-
term risk of failing to utilize mechanisms that enhance the world’s 
ability to mitigate climate change. 
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Table 1: Ptemp for different set of expectations about P2,2 (scenarios a to i), and different discount 
rates. 
Case P1,1  Probability that P2,2 be  Ptemp 
Assuming discount rate of 
   $0 $10  $13.4  $20  $50 3% 6%  10% 
a  $10  100%  0% 0% 0% 0%  $10.0  $10.0  $10.0 
b  $10  0% 100% 0%  0%  0%  $1.4 $2.5 $3.8 
c  $10  0%  0% 100% 0%  0%  <0  $0  $1.7 
d  $10 0% 0% 0%  100%  0% <0  <0  <0 
e  $10  80%  5% 5% 5% 5%  $6.0  $6.5  $7.1 
f  $10 5% 80% 5%  5%  5%  <0 $0.9 $2.4 
g  $10 5%  5% 80% 5%  5%  <0  <0 $0.9 
h  $10 5% 5% 5%  80%  5% <0  <0  <0 
i  $10 5% 5% 5% 5%  80% <0  <0  <0 
 
 